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a.  Remedies available to a party are a key consideration for that party, particularly if the
contract is breached. However, issues relating to remedial provisions are difficult and central substan-
tive issues have been the focus of a large part of the discussion and deliberation surrounding applica-
tion of commercial law.1 At the same time, no aspect of a system of contract law is more revealing of
its underlying assumptions than is the law that prescribes the relief available for breach of contract.2
It is where a system’s solutions to a large proportion of real world disputes in commercial transac-
tions are to be found. In practical terms, it may be said that the remedial scheme is the substantive
heart of a particular system of contract law, which will be a powerful support for the harmonization
of actual outcomes and improve the reliability of the often unpredictable results of disputes.3
b.  Generally speaking, the remedies available to an aggrieved party for a breach of contract
can in all significant legal systems be classified into three basic categories.
-Firstly, an aggrieved party may be able to claim specific performance. As such, specific perfor
mance hardly gives the aggrieved party exactly the performance to which he was entitled to,
unless it is supplemented with some kind of an additional remedy, such as monetary relief.
-Secondly, the aggrieved party may have the right to require substitutionary relief. A relevant
relief here is compensation, and almost always a monetary compensation for the loss that the
party has suffered for performance not received.
-Finally, the aggrieved party may have the right to put an end to the contractual relationship.
In such a case, the third remedy can also be seen in that the aggrieved party is put into a
position where he would have been had the contract never been made.
The three categories are not exclusive in that monetary compensation will also very often be available
together with a claim for specific performance and an act to put an end to the contract. Furthermore,
the above mentioned basic categories of remedies also appear in different variations, such as a right
to price reduction and suspension of performance.4
c.  The CISG follows the above mentioned three-category system. The remedies available
for a breach of contract are summarized under the Convention in Arts. 45 and 61. These Articles set
forth reciprocal remedies for the buyer and seller for breach of contract. According to Art. 45(1)
which specifies remedies for breach of contract by the seller, in case of a seller’s non-compliance with
a contract or CISG obligation, in principal the following five legal remedies (defects rights) are at the
buyer’s disposal:
Right to performance (Art. 46(1));
Right to cure (Art. 48);
Right to avoid the contract because of a fundamental breach of contract (Art. 49(1)(a));
Right of price reduction (Art. 50, sentence 1);
-Right to damages (Art. 45(1)(b) in connection with Arts. 74-77).5
Thus, Art. 45 offers an overview of the remedies available to the buyer in the event of a breach —
specific performance, avoidance, compensatory damages, and price reduction. In a parallel manner,
the seller’s remedies are enumerated at Art. 61(1) when the buyer is in default. Although the rem-
edies available to the seller under Art. 61(1) are comparable to those available to the buyer under Art.
45(1), they are less complicated. This is so because the buyer has only two principal obligations, to
pay the price and to take delivery of the goods, whereas the seller’s obligations are more complex.
Therefore, the seller has no remedies comparable to the following which are available to the buyer:
reduction of the price because of non-conformity of the goods (Art. 50), right to partially exercise his
remedies in the case of partial delivery of the goods (Art. 51), and right to refuse to take delivery in
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case of delivery before the date fixed or of an excess quantity of goods (Art. 52).6
d.  Under the Convention the notion “breach of contract” covers all failures of a party to perform any
of his obligations.7 The notion of breach of contract under the CISG comprises any non-fulfilment of
contractual obligations. Those obligations may have their origin not only in the contract between par-
ties, but also in the Convention, established practices and usages (Art. 9). This refers to non-fulfilment
of obligations by the seller and to non-performance of obligations by the buyer. The rights of the
other party are provided for in parallel: compare Art. 45 et seq. with Art. 61 et seq. There is no
distinction between breaches of main obligations or breaches of auxiliary obligations, rather, a distinc-
tion is made between fundamental breaches of contract and other breaches of contract (Art. 25). A breach of
contract constitutes an objective fact; no matter whether the party who commits the breach is at fault
or not.8 In other words, by contrast with the ULIS approach where each individual type of breach was
followed by the proper remedy, the CISG uses the uniform term of breach of contract, which under
the CISG comprises any non-fulfilment of contractual obligations whether the party who commits
the breach is at fault or not.
e.  This is true of the PECL, which also uses the unitary concept of non-performance (for the sake of
simplicity, the term non-performance is used here equally to the CISG term breach) both for the excused
and the non-excused non-performance. It is noted that non-performance as used in the PECL covers
failure to perform an obligation under the contract in any way, whether by a complete failure to do
anything, late performance or defective performance. Furthermore, it covers both excused and non-
excused non-performance.9 On the other hand, according to PECL Art. 8:101, the remedies available
for non-performance depend upon whether the non-performance is not excused, is excused due to an
impediment under Art. 8:108 or results from behavior of the other party. A non-performance which
is not excused may give the aggrieved party the right to claim performance — recovery of money due
(Art. 9:101) or specific performance (Art. 9:102) — to claim damages and interest (Arts. 9:501 through
9:510), to withhold its own performance (Art. 9:201), to terminate the contract (Arts. 9:301 through
9:309) and to reduce its own performance (Art. 9:401). If a party violates a duty to receive or accept
performance, the other party may also make use of the remedies just mentioned.10 Thus, the PECL
also generally corresponds with the major legal systems in providing the above mentioned three-
category remedial system.
f.  However, under certain conditions the breaching or non-performing party may be exempted from
certain consequences of a failure to perform his obligations while the other remedies remain unaf-
fected and are still available to the aggrieved party. Textually, the excuse granted in Art. 79 CISG
exempts only the breaching party from liability for damages. All the other remedies of the other
parties are not affected by this excuse, i.e., demand for performance, reduction of the price or avoid-
ance of the contract.11 The Secretariat Commentary clearly states: “Even if the impediment is of such
a nature as to render impossible any further performance, the other party retains the right to require
that performance under article 42 or 58 [draft counterpart of CISG article 46 or 62].”12 In other words,
even in case of impossibility, the other party could ask for specific performance — a result that is
hardly convincing.13 By contrast, PECL Art. 8:101(2) specifies that where there is an impediment
which fulfils the conditions set by PECL Art. 8:108, the aggrieved party may resort to any of the
remedies set out in PECL Chapter 9 except claiming performance and damages. Any form of specific
performance (Arts. 9:101 and 9:102) is by definition impossible.14 However, this rigid solution might
lead to some unreasonable situations particularly in case of temporary impediments. Although it
seems to amount to an obvious contradiction because it is supposed that performance is not possible,
it has become clear at least that the right to performance continues to exist in the event of temporary
grounds for exemption and that auxiliary claims that are related to it, like interest, continue to accu-
mulate.15
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g.  Despite the exempted remedies difference, there is agreement between the CISG and the PECL
that the fact that the non-performance is caused by the creditor’s act or omission has an effect to that
extent on the remedies open to the obligee. This is expressed by either CISG Art. 80 or PECL Art.
8:101(3). It would be contrary to good faith and fairness for the creditor to have a remedy when it is
responsible for the non-performance. In such a case, the most obvious situation is the so-called mora
creditoris, where the creditor directly prevents performance (e.g., access refused to a building site). But
there are other cases where the creditor’s behavior has an influence on the breach and its conse-
quences. In other cases where there is also a non-performance by the debtor, the creditor may exercise
the remedies for non-performance to a limited extent. When the loss is caused both by the debtor --
which has not performed -- and the creditor -- which has partially caused the breach by its own
behavior -- the creditor should not have the whole range of remedies. The creditor’s contribution to
the non-performance has an effect on the remedy “to the extent that (the other party’s) failure to perform
(is) caused by its own act or omission.” In other words, this effect may be total, that is to say that the
creditor cannot exercise any remedy, or partial. The exact consequence of the creditor’s behavior will
be examined with each remedy.16 In any event, a non-performance which is due solely to the other
party’s wrongful prevention does not give the latter any remedy. In most of the systems, the party who
has prevented performance will himself be the non-performing party against whom the remedies may
be exercised.17
h.  Among other things, it is to be noted that CISG Art. 45(2)/61(2) provides that a party who resorts
to any remedy available to him under the contract or this Convention is not thereby deprived of the
right to claim any damages which he may have incurred. Thus, the cumulation of damage claims with
other remedies is explicitly contemplated. In other words, either Art. 45(2) or Art. 61(2) rejects the
notion that the buyer/seller is forced to elect between claiming damages and exercising the other
remedies conferred on him under the Convention, viz., specific performance and avoidance. The
common law position is the same and, in particular, it is basic law that a buyer who rejects non-
conforming goods or cancels the contract on some other ground is not thereby deprived of his en-
titlement to damages.18 Thus, the right to claim damages exists either as an exclusive right or as a
supplementary right besides the right to require performance or payment, to reduce the price or to
avoid the contract. The rule in CISG Art. 45(2)/61(2) is followed and furthered in a separate Art.
8:102 under the PECL. As is stated: “Remedies which are not incompatible may be cumulated.” A
party which is entitled to withhold its performance and to terminate the contract may first withhold
and then terminate. A party which pursues a remedy other than damages is not precluded from
claiming damages. A party which terminates the contract may, for instance, also claim damages.19
i.  It is a truism that a party cannot at the same time pursue two or more remedies which are incom-
patible with each other. Thus a party cannot at the same time claim specific performance of the
contract and terminate it. If a party has received a non-conforming tender, it cannot exercise its right
to reduce its own performance and at the same time terminate the contract. A non-performance
which causes the aggrieved party to suffer a loss may give it a right to be compensated for that loss, but
it cannot be awarded more than the “réparation intégrale”. Thus, if it has accepted a non-conforming
tender, the value of which is less than that of a conforming tender, and if it has claimed or obtained
a reduction of the price corresponding to the decrease in value, it cannot also claim compensation for
that same decrease in value as damages. When two remedies are incompatible with each other, the
aggrieved party will often have to choose between them. However, PECL Art. 8:102 does not pre-
clude an aggrieved party which has elected one remedy from shifting to another later, even though
the later remedy is incompatible with the first remedy elected. If, after having claimed specific perfor-
mance, it learns that the defaulting party has not performed or is not likely to do so within a reason-
able time, the aggrieved party may terminate the contract. On the other hand, an election of a rem-
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edy is often definite and will preclude later elections of incompatible remedies. A party which has
terminated the contract cannot later claim specific performance, because by giving notice of termina-
tion the aggrieved party may have caused the other party to act in reliance of the termination. If a
defaulting party has adapted itself to a claim for specific performance and taken measures to perform
within a reasonable time, the aggrieved party cannot change its position and terminate the contract.
This applies when the defaulting party has received a notice fixing an additional time for perfor-
mance. The rule is in accordance with the widely accepted principle that when a party has made a
declaration of intention which has caused the other party to act in reliance of the declaration the
party making it will not be permitted to act inconsistently with it. This follows from the general
principle of fair dealing.20
j.  However, it should be mentioned here that not only the obligations of the parties but also the
remedies may be changed by them in their contract. The provisions in either CISG Art. 45/61 or
PECL Arts. 8:101 and 8:102 are premised on the assumption that the parties have not chosen some
other remedy or remedies within their contractual relationship. Any such remedies chosen by the
parties would always prevail. Contractual freedom is thus the rule, also reflecting the starting point
for various legal systems in general. Moreover, it is important to note that the remedies available for
a breach of contract will be subject to, not only the express agreement made between the parties, but
also any practice or usage which can be regarded as an implied part of the agreement. In case of a
breach of contract it is, therefore, necessary to first look into the contract executed between the
parties or any practice or usage of relevance.21 Only if the agreement and any relevant practice or
usage is silent, the provisions of the applicable rules – CISG, UNIDROIT Principles or PECL or any
other laws — concerning remedies will be at hand. However, it should also be noted that, in cases of
such remedies chosen by the parties or implied by relevant practice or usage, potential uncertainty
may arise depending on the types of remedies chosen by the parties. This becomes a clearer problem
in the context of the CISG, Art. 4 of which sets forth the scope of its application and expressly
excludes “the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage.” Moreover, although
the CISG does give the parties the freedom to choose their own remedies, it is not necessarily clear
that these remedies will be enforced the same way in every country, if at all.22
k.  Finally, it is to be noted that, under the Convention, Art. 45(3)/61(3) each provides that if the
entitled party resorts to a remedy for breach of contract, no court or arbitral tribunal may delay the
exercise of that remedy by granting a period of grace either before, at the same time as, or after the
buyer has resorted to the remedy. Such provision seems desirable in international trade.23 Thus,
domestic laws that permit the courts or arbitral tribunals to grant a seller in breach extra time to
perform are expressly excluded. This is mainly because the Convention specifically rejects the idea
that in a commercial contract for the international sale of goods the party may, as a general rule,
avoid the contract merely because the contract date for performance has passed and the obligated
party has not as yet performed its obligations. In these circumstances, as a general rule, the other
party may do so if, and only if, the failure to perform on the contract date causes him substantial
detriment [results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to
expect under the contract] and the party in default foresaw or had reason to foresee such a result. As a
result of this rule in the Convention, there was no reason to allow the buyer/seller to apply to a court
for a delay of grace, as is permitted in some legal systems. Moreover, the procedure of applying to a
court for a delay of grace is particularly inappropriate in the context of international commerce,
especially since this would expose the parties to the broad discretion of a judge who would usually be
of the same nationality as one of the parties.24 Nonetheless, if the parties have expressly referred to an
arbitral procedure that allows such feature, the arbitration rule should prevail over Art. 45 or 61,
following the principle of Art. 6. But, the mere fact that the parties are litigating before a court whose
procedure allows some “délai de grace” should not be regarded as an agreement to have such a rule
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apply.25
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